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We analyze labor market models where the law of one price does not hold
— i.e. models with equilibrium wage dispersion. We begin assuming work-
ers are ex ante heterogeneous, and highlight a ﬂaw with this approach:
if search is costly, the market shuts down. We then assume workers are
homogeneous but matches are ex post heterogeneous. This model is ro-
bust to search costs, and delivers equilibria equilibrium wage dispersion.
However, we prove the law of two prices holds: generically we cannot get
more than two wages. We explore several other models, including one
combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity; this model is robust, and
can deliver more than two-point wage distributions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
According to Mortensen (2003, p.9), “If the law of one price were to hold in the
labor market, similar workers would not be paid diﬀerently.” This observation
is both obvious and deep.
The fact is, similar workers do appear to be paid diﬀerently. As Mortensen
(2003, p.1) reports, “Although hundreds if not thousands of empirical studies
that estimate so-called human capital wage equations verify that worker char-
acteristics that one could view as indicators of labor productivity are positively
related to wages earned, the theory is woefully incomplete in its explanatory
power. Observable worker characteristics that are supposed to account for pro-
ductivity diﬀerences typically explain no more that 30 percent of the variation
in compensation.” What explains the rest? It is clear that one needs a model
with some sort of frictions to address the issue.
Search theory is ideally suited to the task. In their survey, Eckstein and
van den Berg (2005, p.33) argue that “equilibrium search models provide a
framework to empirically analyze the sources of wage dispersion: a) workers
heterogeneity (observed and unobserved); b) ﬁrm productivity heterogeneity
(observed and unobserved); c) market frictions. The equilibrium framework
can ... empirically measure the quantitative importance of each source.” For
example, van den Berg and Ridder (1998) estimate that up to 25% of wage
variability is attributable to frictions, in the sense that this is what would emerge
from a model without assuming heterogeneity. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
estimate up to 50%.
It is perhaps fair to say that the benchmark model for studying wage disper-
sion is the one developed by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), which is based on
wage posting and on-the-job search. The goal of this paper is to explore some
alternative models where the law of one price does not hold in the labor mar-
ket. It is not that there is anything especially wrong with Burdett-Mortensen.1
However, it is good to have some alternatives on the table. These alternatives
need not be mutually exclusive, of course; there may be several reasons for wage
dispersion in the world and it seems interesting to consider various options, per-
haps ultimately integrating the diﬀerent models in one framework and using the
1There are some issues with this model, however, such as the fact that the baseline model
predicts a very unrealistic wage distribution, in the sense that the density is upward sloping
(there are more high wage than low wage workers). This can be ﬁxed by adding ﬁrm hetero-
g e n e i t yo re xa n t eﬁrm investments, e.g., as discussed in Mortensen (2000, 2003), but it would
be nice if a simpler version was more in line with the data.
2data to measure the importance of each. Here we are not that ambitious, and
the goal is to develop theoretically several alternative models that each imply
the possibility of a non-degenerate wage distribution.
We emphasize that it is not easy to get wage dispersion across homogeneous
workers in equilibrium, in the sense that the well-known Diamond (1972) model,
which seems on the surface the natural model in which to think about the issues,
predicts a single wage even in the presence of search frictions. Of course there
are several well-known ways to get around this result, including Burdett and
Mortensen (1998), which introduces on-the-job search, including Burdett and
Judd (1983), which introduces the idea that some workers may get multiple
oﬀers, and including Albrecht and Axell (1984), which introduces heterogeneous
outside options for workers (values of leisure). Note that in all of these examples
there is a sense in which workers are heterogenous, but the point is that they
have the same productivity and yet still can end up receiving diﬀerent wages
in equilibrium. In any case, the goal here is to explore some new models and
ideas.2
We begin with models where workers have ex ante heterogeneous outside
options, in the spirit of Albrecht and Axell (1984), although the details are
quite diﬀerent. We point out a ﬂaw in this class of models: once we introduce
positive costs of search, no matter how small, equilibrium unravels. Thus, there
will always be one type who will drop out, but once they do, another type drops
out, and so on, until we are back to Diamond (1972). Given this, we introduce
a framework where workers are homogeneous but matches are heterogeneous.
That is, ex ante all workers are the same, but there are match-speciﬁcs h o c k s
so that diﬀerent workers attach diﬀerent valuations to diﬀerent jobs (although
productivity is still the same). In this model the market does not shut down
for positive search costs, and it does deliver equilibria where the law of one
p r i c ef a i l s . H o w e v e r ,w ep r o v et h a tthe law of two prices holds: as shown in
Curtis and Wright (2004) in the context of monetary theory, in search models
with match-speciﬁc shocks, one can get more than one price but generically one
cannot get more than two.
We also explore some other models. To motivate these, note that in Albrecht-
Axell or Burdett-Judd style models, the reason diﬀerent ﬁrms may post diﬀerent
2In this paper we are interested in models where ﬁrms post wages, as opposed to bargaining
with individual workers after they meet. Any bargaining model with heterogeneous agents or
heterogeneous matches, such as Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), can generate wage disper-
sion, but we follow the literature that asks how one can get a nondegenerate distribution of
posted wages.
3wages is that high-wage ﬁrms have a high inﬂow of workers (they recruit faster).
In Burdett-Mortensen, high-wage ﬁrms also have a high inﬂow of workers, and
additionally have a low outﬂow (they lose workers more slowly). For complete-
ness, we present a model where all ﬁrms have the same inﬂow but high-wage
ﬁrms have a low outﬂow, and one where high-wage ﬁrms get better performance
from their workforce.3 In each case we prove that the law of one price does not
hold, and that the law of two prices does. We also show how to combine ap-
proaches. This is important because the unravelling of models with search costs
and the law of two prices can be both be overturned when we have both ex ante
and ex post shocks. Hence, this delivers a robust model with a more empirically
interesting wage distribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some
models with ex ante heterogeneity and discuss unravelling. In Section 3, we
introduce models with ex post heterogeneity and prove the law of two wages.
In Section 4, we discuss some other approaches. In Section 5, we combine ex
ante and ex post heterogeneity. In Section 6 we conclude.
2 Ex Ante Heterogeneity
2.1 A Simple Model
There is a [0,1] continuum of ﬁrms and a [0,L] continuum of workers. There
are K types of workers. A measure Lj of workers are type j, and they have
utility of leisure bj w h e r ew eo r d e rt y p e ss u c ht h a tbj+1 >b j, j =1 ,...K,a n d
P
j Lj =1 . Firms post wages. Each ﬁrm has a constant returns technology
with labor as the only input, and productivity y>b K (if there are any workers
with bj >ythey will never be hired and will drop out). For now we follow
Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and assume ﬁrms are interested in maximizing
steady state proﬁt, and will hire as many workers as are willing to accept; we
consider diﬀerent models of ﬁrm behavior below. All agents are risk neutral and
discount at rate r. Unemployed workers contact ﬁrms at rate αw,a n dt h e r ei s
no on-the-job search.
G i v e na n yd i s t r i b u t i o no fp o s t e dw a g e sF(w), it should be obvious that each
type of worker will have a reservation wage wj such that he accepts w ≥ wj and
3The ﬁrst of these is in the spirit of the Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003) model of crime,
although considerably simpler; the second is in the spirit of the eﬃciency wage literature, such
as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), although as far as we know, existing eﬃciency wage models do
not generate endogenous wage dispersion.
4rejects w<w j,w i t hwj+1 >w j. It is equally apparent that, in any equilibrium,
no ﬁrm would post anything other than one of the reservation wages. For if you
post w ∈ (wj,w j+1),y o uc a nr e d u c ew down to wj and make more proﬁtp e r
worker without changing the set of workers who accept. A special case of this
is the Diamond (1972) result when K =1 : with homogeneous workers — say
L1 =1 , without loss of generality — all ﬁrms post w1. Moreover, in this case
w1 = b1. To see why, assume all ﬁrms are posting w>b 1;t h e na sl o n ga sr>0,
you can post w − ε for some ε>0 and still hire every worker you contact. So
in equilibrium all ﬁrms must post w = w1 = b1.
Consider the case K =2 . Then there are at most two wages w1 and w2
posted in equilibrium. Let θ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of ﬁrms posting w2 and thus
1 − θ the fraction posting w1.L e tUj be the value function of an unemployed
worker of type j and Wj(w) the value function of a type j worker employed at
w. Since we already know the only posted wages are w1 and w2,t h er e l e v a n t
ﬂow Bellman equations for unemployed workers are
rU1 = b1 + αw (1 − θ)[W1(w1) − U1]+αwθ[W1(w2) − U1]
rU2 = b2 + αwθ[W2(w2) − U2],
w h e r ew eu s et h er e s u l tt h a tt y p e2a c c e p t sw2 but not w1, while type 1 ac-
cepts both oﬀers. Indeed, the reservation property implies W1(w1)=U1 and
W2(w2)=U2, and so these simplify to
rU1 = b1 + αwθ[W1(w2) − U1]
rU2 = b2
Again using the reservation property, the employed workers’ Bellman equa-
tions are
rW1(w1)=w1
rW1(w2)=w2 + δ[U1 − W1(w2)]
rW2(w2)=w2.
Taken together, these equations imply w2 = b2 and
w1 =
(r + δ)b1 + αwθb2
r + δ + αwθ
. (1)
Notice w1 is a weighted average of b1 and b2,a n dw1 >b 1 if and only if θ>0.
Type 1 workers do not accept w = b1 if θ>0, because there is a chance of
getting w2 = b2.N o t i c e∂w1/∂θ > 0
5Now consider ﬁrms. For now we follow Burdett-Mortensen and assume each
ﬁrm is interested in maximizing steady state proﬁt. To compute this, let ρj be
the probability a random unemployed worker accepts wj.T h e naﬁrm posting
wj hires at rate αfρj, the rate at which it meets workers times the probability
they accept, and expects to earn
y−wj
r+δ from each worker it hires, where δ is an





For a ﬁrm posting w2, ρ2 =1 ,a n df o raﬁrm posting w1, ρ1 = L1u1
L1u1+L2u2,w h e r e





L1 (αwθ + δ)
L1 (αwθ + δ)+L2 (αw + δ)
.
We are interested in the sign of Π2 − Π1, since this determines the optimal
wage posting strategy. This is equal in sign to y−w2 −ρ1(y−w1),w h i c h ,a f t e r
inserting ρ1,w 1 and w2 and simplifying, can be shown to be equal in sign to
the following linear function of θ:
T(θ)={[L1 (r + δ)+L2 (αw + δ)](y − b2) − L1 (r + δ)(y − b1)}αwθ
+[L1δ (r + δ)+L2 (αw + δ)(r + δ)](y − b2) (2)
−L1δ (r + δ)(y − b1)
The following best response condition must hold in any equilibrium:
θ =0if T(0) < 0; θ =1if T(1) > 0;a n di fθ ∈ (0,1) then T(θ)=0 . (3)




L1δ (y − b1) − [L1δ + L2 (αw + δ)](y − b2)
[L1 (r + δ)+L2 (αw + δ)](y − b2) − L1 (r + δ)(y − b1)
. (4)
Proposition 1 For all αw, there exists a unique solution to (3), and 0 <θ<1
iﬀ y <y<y where
y = b2 +
δL1(b2 − b1)
(αw + δ)L2
and y = y +
rαwL1(b2 − b1)
(r + αw + δ)(αw + δ)L2
. (5)
4The original Burdett-Mortensen model actually proceeds by noting that in steady state
a ﬁrm posting wj ends up with a stock αfρj/δ of workers and is interested in maximizing
αfρj/δ(y − wj). This yields exactly the same results in the model under consideration.
6Proof. Existence is easy. If T(0) ≤ 0 then θ =0satisﬁes (3). Suppose T(0) > 0.
If T(1) ≥ 0 then θ =1satisﬁes (3). If T(1) < 0 then by continuity there exists a
θ ∈ (0,1) that satisﬁes (3). Uniqueness follows from the result that T 0(θ) < 0 at





The thresholds y and y come from checking when T(0) > 0 and T(1) < 0. ¥
When productivity is low all ﬁrms pay w1 = b1, when it is high all ﬁrms
pay w2 = b2, and when it is in the intermediate region (y,y), there is wage
dispersion. We can now solve explicitly for w1,a sw e l la st h en u m b e ro fw o r k e r s
earning wj, the unemployment rate, and so on, in the range where θ ∈ (0,1) by
inserting (4) into (1). For example, normalizing b1 =0without loss of generality,
we have
w1 =
L2 (δ + αw)(y − b2) − L1δb2
rL1
.
Notice w1 = b1 =0at y = y and w1 is (linearly) increasing in y up to w1 =
αwb2
r+δ+αw at y = y.
The distribution of wages paid can then be calculated easily given the steady-
state conditions: w = w1 with probability 1−π and w = w2 with probability π
where π =  2
 1+ 2 and  i is the steady-state measure of workers who are employed
at wi. T h i si st ob ec o n t r a s t e dw i t ht h ed i stribution of wages posted, which
is given by w = w1 with probability 1 − θ and w = w2 with probability θ.
Typically π is bigger than θ since w2 ﬁrms have more workers than w1 ﬁrms,
which is precisely how they can have equal proﬁts. Notice that in this model
we can have a decreasing density, in the sense that π<1/2 < 1 − π.T h i si si n
contrast to the basic Burdett-Mortensen model where the density is increasing,
contrary to the data. Of course, in the K =2case, our density is not very
r e a l i s t i ci na n o t h e rs e n s e—t h e r ea r eo n l yt w ow a g e s . W es h o wb e l o wh o wt o
generalize this.
It remains to discuss the arrival rates. As we mentioned earlier, the measure
of ﬁrms is ﬁxed at unity, and each ﬁrm will hire as many workers as it can
get. Suppose we assume a CRS meeting technology, m(nu,n f),w h e r enu is the
number of unemployed workers and nf =1is the number of ﬁrms. Then the
rate at which workers contact ﬁrms is αw = m(nu,n f)/nu,w h i c hg i v e nnf =1




















An equilibrium is then a pair (αw,θ) satisfying equations (3) and (6). Once αw
7is known, αf = m(nu,n f)/nf can be calculated, but notice that αf only aﬀects
the level of proﬁts and not the sign of Π2 − Π1, and so it does not aﬀect the
equilibrium values of θ, wj and so on.
Consider for the sake of illustration the special case where m(nu,n f)=
Amin{nu,n f} = Amin{L1u1 + L2u2,1}, a matching function that arises in
various applications (see e.g. Lagos 2000). This implies m(nu,n f)=Anu
and hence αw = A as long as L1u1 + L2u2 ≤ 1 which always holds if L ≤ 1,
which we are always free to assume. In this case, the arrival rate for workers
is essentially exogenous. Hence, equilibrium is completely characterized by (3),
and everything to be said about it is contained in Proposition 1.
We will not dwell on existence or uniqueness/multiplicity in the case of
a general matching technology, but instead we present another, less extreme,




can solve (6) in this case for
θ =
L2δ/αw
(A/αw)1/γ − L1δ/(αw + δ)
− δ/αw. (7)
Figure 1 plots (4) and (7) in (αw,θ) space, the former labeled θEP for “equal
proﬁt” and the latter labeled θMF for “matching function.” As one can see,
there are two solutions for θ ∈ (0,1).
Figure 1: Multiple Equilibrium
Hence, the model not only is capable of generating wage dispersion, it also
yields multiple equilibria with wage dispersion.5 The intuition for this result,
5It is not that easy to construct examples for realistic parameter values with θ ∈ (0,1)
8which seems novel compared to the existing literature on multiplicity, is as
follows. Suppose lots of ﬁrms are paying the high wage w2 = b2,s ot h a tθ is
relatively big. Then from (1) we see that w1 is relatively big. This makes it
relatively less proﬁtable to try to get away with paying the low wage w1 and
hence more ﬁrms end up posting w2.
2.2 Alternative Assumptions
An alternative assumption as regards ﬁrm behavior is that each employer may
post at most one vacancy, along the lines of the models in Pissarides (2000),
at cost k.T h e n ﬁrms maximize the present discounted value of vacancies (as
opposed to steady state proﬁt). Mortensen (2000) shows that adopting this
alternative scenario gives similar results in the basic Burdett-Mortensen model,
under some conditions, and we want to see how it aﬀects outcomes here.
Let Vi denote the value of a ﬁrm with a vacancy posting wage wi,a n dJi
the value of having the job ﬁlled. Then we have
rVj = αfρj (Jj − Vj) − k (8)
rJj = y − wj + δ (Vj − Jj). (9)
Solving the system yields
rVj =
αfρj (y − wj + k)
r + δ + αfρj
− k. (10)
Compared with Πj, the diﬀerences are that k appears, and that αfρj shows up
in the denominator of Vj.I n s e r t i n gρ1 and w1 into V2 −V1, we see that it takes




L2 (δ + αw)
r + δ + αf
¸
(y − b2) − L1 (y − b1)+
L2 (δ + αw)







L2 (δ + αw)(r + δ)
r + δ + αf
¸
(y − b2) − L1δ (y − b1)
+
L2 (δ + αw)(r + δ)
r + δ + αf
k.
Assume ﬁrst k =0 . As in the previous model, the best response condition
(3) must hold in any equilibrium, and for any aw and αf there exists a unique
because, as one can see from (5), the interval (y,y) is small when r is small. The example in
the ﬁgure uses r =0 .1, b1 =0 .1, b2 =1 .8, y =2 .165, L1 = L2 =0 .5, δ =0 .05, A =0 .17,a n d
γ =0 .5.
9solution to this condition, with 0 <θ<1 iﬀ y <y<y (although the values for















to determine αw and then αf, except here we need to replace v =1with
v =1 − L(1 − L1u1 − L2u2) since, with k =0 , all ﬁrms that do not have
a worker are recruiting (in the previous model all ﬁrms were recruiting, even
those that had workers, because they want to employ as many people as they
can get).
This model is very much like the previous one, except now both αw and αf
enter the T function. This means that we cannot use m(nu,n f)=Amin{nu,n f}
to eliminate the arrival rates from T,a sw ed i di nt h ep r e v i o u sm o d e l :w ec a n
eliminate αw = A, but that still leaves αf. However, a diﬀerent trick to simplify
m a t t e r si st oa s s u m ee q u a ln u m b e r so fw o r k e r sa n dﬁrms: L =1 . Then, given
we are assuming k =0so that all ﬁrms post vacancies, every ﬁlled job takes
one worker and one vacancy oﬀ the market, leaving the ratio nu/nf the same.
Hence, constant returns in the matching function implies the arrival rates are
again eﬀectively exogenous, and all that one needs to determine is θ.6
Now consider k>0, so not all ﬁrms necessarily post vacancies. Free entry
implies Vj =0for any wj that is actually posted. To focus on the more inter-
esting outcomes, consider any equilibrium with θ>0.T h e n s o m e ﬁrms post





This pins down αf, from which we can determine the vacancy-unemployment
ratio u/v through αf = m(u/v,1),a n dt h e nαw = m(1,v/u). Substituting αf
and αw into T then allows us to determine θ, which completes the description
of equilibrium.
2.3 Discussion
We have illustrated under various assumptions that simple models with ex ante
heterogenous workers can generate wage dispersion. As we said above, this is
6It is not that we think that these special assumptions about matching are particularly
good; we are simply providing speciﬁcations where the model generates simple results about
the wage distribution without having to worry about arrival rates.
10very much in the spirit of the Albrecht-Axell model, although the details of our
set up are quite diﬀerent. Moreover, this framework generalizes quite easily to
t h ec a s eo fK types. There will now be K reservation wages, w1,...wK,a n d
in equilibrium these are posted with probabilities θ1,...θK where
PK
j=1 θj =1 .
Of course, some values of θj may be 0 in equilibrium, but clearly no ﬁrm will
post anything other than one of the K reservation wages. Eckstein and Wolpin
(1990) analyze this version of the model empirically.
However, this class of models, with any value of K,h a sap r o b l e m :t h e ya r e
not robust to the introduction of any search cost ε>0.I nt h ec a s eo fK =2 ,
what happens is that the high reservation wage workers (those with b = b2)g e t
zero surplus from search — they reject w1, and while they may accept w2 for
them it is no better than unemployment. Hence they will not search if ε>0.
But then no ﬁrm will post anything other than w1 and we are back to Diamond
(1972). Obviously this is true for any K: worker types with the highest bK get
no surplus, so they drop out if ε>0,a n dt h e r ea r eK − 1 types left, and so
on. We cannot get robust wage dispersion with ex ante heterogeneity. Indeed,
things are worse than one might think: once all but type 1 workers drop out,
given ε>0, they will drop out too and the market shuts down. Based on
these observations we think it is worth considering some alternatives to ex ante
heterogeneity.
3 Ex Post Heterogeneity
3.1 Permanent Shocks
Consider a model where workers are ex ante homogeneous, but matches are ex
post heterogeneous. In particular, when a worker contacts a ﬁrm, he draws
at random a match-speciﬁc c ∈ {c1,...,cK},w h e r ec is the per period cost to
accepting the job. For example, c could be the cost of commuting, working with
people you may or may not like, etc.7 For now c is permanent (later we will also
consider the case where workers draw a new c each period). As in the previous
section, we start with K =2and consider K>2 below. Thus, c = c1 with
probability λ and c = c2 >c 1 with probability 1−λ.A s s u m eb+c2 <y . Again,
we begin by assuming that ﬁrms post wages to maximize steady state proﬁt, as
7This model is similar to Burdett and Wright (1998), which is also based on non-pecuniary
match-speciﬁc shocks, except there the wage is ﬁxed. Burdett and Wright (1993) and Masters
(1999) discuss ways to endogenize w in these kinds of models, but they do not consider wage
dispersion in their analyses.
11in Burdett-Mortensen.
It should be obvious that each worker now has two reservation wages: he
accepts w ≥ w1 if he draws c1 in a match, and accepts w ≥ w2 if he draws c2.
For the same reason as in the previous model, there will be at most two wages
posted — no ﬁrm would post anything other than w1 or w2.A s a b o v e w e l e t
θ be the fraction of ﬁrms posting w2, and we now let Wj(w) be the value to
having a job with w = w and c = cj,a n dU the value of unemployed search. A
key diﬀerence from the previous section is that here U is not indexed by type
— there are no types, as all workers are ex ante identical. Also, there Wj(w)
denoted the value function for a type j worker employed at w, while here it is
the value function for worker in a type j match employed at w.
The reservation wage conditional on c = cj satisﬁes Wj(wj)=U.T h e
Bellman equation for unemployed workers is
rU = b + αwλθ[W1(w2) − U], (11)
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ef a c t st h a ti fy o ud r a wc2 you do not accept w1,a n di f
you draw cj you may accept wj but you get no surplus from doing so. Also,
rWj(w)=w − cj + δ[U − Wj(w)].
Solving these equations, we can derive








A ﬁrm posting w1 hires at rate αfλ and expects to earn
y−w1
r+δ from each







αf (y − w2)
r + δ
.
T h es a m em e t h o d su s e da b o v ei m p l yΠ2 − Π1 takes the same sign as
T(θ)=( r + δ)[(1− λ)(y − b) − (c2 − λc1)] − αwλ(1 − λ)(c2 − c1)θ. (12)
An equilibrium still must satisfy the best response condition (3).
12Proposition 2 For all αw, there exists a unique solution to (3), and 0 <θ<1
iﬀ y <y<y where
y = b +
c2 − λc1
1 − λ




Proof. Existence is the same as Proposition 1. Uniqueness is even easier here
since T 0(θ) < 0 for all θ. Again, the thresholds y and y come from checking
when T(0) > 0 and T(1) < 0. ¥




(1 − λ)(y − b) − (c2 − λc1)
λ(1 − λ)(c2 − c1)
.
Using this value of θ, we can solve for wages in the case where θ ∈ (0,1):




When θ =0 , the unique posted wage is w1 = b+c1,a n dw h e nθ =1 , the unique
posted wage is w2 = b + c2 + αwλ
r+δ (c2 − c1).N o t e t h a t w2 >b+ c2 because a
worker who draws c2 and has oﬀer w2 would prefer to turn it down and wait to
get c1 and w2.8
We can again consider diﬀerent assumptions regarding ﬁrm behavior. When
each ﬁrm can hire at most one worker and has to post a vacancy to recruit, the











δ + αw [θ +( 1− θ)λ]
is the unemployment rate. The fraction θ of ﬁrms posting w2 is still given by
(12). An equilibrium is a pair (θ,αw) satisfying (12) and (14). Again, in the
special case m(u,v)=Amin{u,v}, we can guarantee αw = A and equilibrium
is fully characterized by (12).





Given αf we can determine αw and this can be inserted into the T(θ) function,
which then pins down θ.
8Also note that in this model y>yeven in the limit as r → 0, unlike the model in the
previous section where y = y at r =0 . This makes it easier to construct relatively realistic
examples with wage dispersion.
133.2 The Law of Two Wages
The model with ex post heterogeneity is not fragile with respect to introducing
search costs. As long as θ>0 it is clear that we can have rU > b, and hence
workers would be willing to search even at a cost. It is also clear that we
can generalize the analysis to the case where c = c1,...,cK with probability
λ = λ1,...λK and what we said goes through. In particular, there will exist K
conditional reservation wages, w1,...wK, such that any worker accepts w ≥ wj
if he draws cj in a match. Things do not unravel here the way they did with ex
ante heterogeneity because there are no types to drop out, and any worker gets
positive gains from search as long as θ1 < 1, since then there is a chance he can
get a job at a wage high enough to make him accept even if he draws cj >c 1,
but he gets lucky and draws c = c1.
Now for something that may be more surprising (if one has not seen a version
of it before). The usual Diamond logic guarantees that no ﬁrm will post any
wage other than one of the K reservation wages w1,...,wK,s oi fw el e tθj be
the fraction posting wage wj,w ek n o w
P
j θj =1 .T h i sm u c hi so b v i o u s .W e
now claim that generically there are never more than two wages actually posted.
Adapting the language in Curtis and Wright (2004), we call this the law of two
wages.
Proposition 3 For generic parameter values, we can have θj > 0 for at most
two values of j.
Proof. For any K, workers’ Bellman equations are






θi [Wj(wi) − U]
rWj(w)=w − cj + δ [U − Wj(w)].
The reservation property implies Wj(wj)=U for all j. This implies
wj = cj + rU. (15)
Now consider proﬁts, and suppose θi > 0, θj > 0, θk > 0 for distinct i, j,a n d
k.T h e nΠi = Πj = Πk =m a x{Π1,...ΠK}. Using (15) we can write
Πj =
αfρj (y − wj)
r + δ
=





h=1 λh is the probability a random worker accepts wj.N o t et h a t
gj(U) depends only on U, j and exogenous variables. The condition Πi = Πj =
Πk therefore implies
gi(U)=gj(U)=gk(U),
a system of two equations in one unknown. For generic parameter values, there
does not exist a solution. ¥
Figure 2: Proﬁt as a Function of w
Although perhaps initially surprising, this result has a simple graphical rep-
resentation. Figure 2 shows the steady state proﬁt Π(w) of a ﬁrm as a function
of its posted wage. For w<w 1 the ﬁrm hires no one, so proﬁti s0.A tw = w1,
Π(w) jumps up because now the ﬁrm hires any worker who shows up and draws
c = c1.F o r w ∈ [w1,w 2), Π(w) is linearly decreasing in w.A n d s o o n . 9 If
w1,...wK were exogenous, then generically Π(w) will attain a maximum at a
unique wj. But they are not exogenous. Hence, one might think they can
adjust endogenously until there are multiple wj maximizing Π(w).T h i si sp r e -
c i s e l yw h a tw ed i di nt h ec a s eK =2to get Π1 = Π2. However, the reservation
wages are all related by (15); hence, it may be possible to adjust one of them so
that Π(w) is maximized at more than one point, but we cannot independently
adjust another one so that Π(w) is maximized at more than two points.10
9Notice the slopes of the decreasing segments are steeper for higher w, simply because
higher wage ﬁrms have more workers. Also, although not shown in the Figure, Π(w) can
easily be negative for some w.
10Jafarey and Masters (2003) analyze a model related to Curtis-Wright, except the match-
speciﬁc shock is a uniformly distributed continuous variable. They show this implies a single
15A detail that may be pointed out is the following: when we say gi(U)=
gj(U)=gk(U) constitutes two equations in one unknown, one might worry that
in fact the g functions depend on αf, which itself may be endogenous. If arrival
rates are endogenous, however, then we need to add one more condition to
determine them and hence we still have more equations than unknowns. More
explicitly, consider the version of the model where each ﬁrm can hire at most
one worker and has to post a vacancy to recruit (this also allows us to show the
results hold in diﬀerent versions of the model and do not depend on maximizing
Π, e.g.). A ﬁrm’s Bellman equations are still given by (8) and (9).
The equal proﬁt condition can be written Vi (U,αf)=Vj (U,αf)=Vk (U,αf)
where, using (15),
Vi (U,αf)=
αfρi (y − cj − rU + k)
r + δ + αfρi
− k.
The free entry condition requires Vj (U,αf)=0 ,o r
αf =
(r + δ)k
ρi (y − cj − rU)
.
Substituting the equilibrium value of αf into Vi (U,αf)=Vj (U,αf)=Vk (U,αf),
we again have a system of two equations in the one unknown U.
4O t h e r M o d e l s
4.1 Transitory Shocks
The above model assumes that when a worker and ﬁrm meet, the match-speciﬁc
shock c is kept forever. Suppose now that c is an i.i.d. draw each period in a
given match, after the job is accepted. Each period, workers decide whether to
come to work, or to stay home that day without losing the job.11 Sometimes
price can be posted in equilibrium (this is not inconsistent with the law of two prices, of
course, which says there are no more than two). Intuitively, with a continuum of shocks there
is a continuum of reservation wages, and the function Π(w) in Figure 2 does not have discrete
jumps. Generalizing Jafarey and Masters, one can show there is a single wage posted if we
assume a continuous dsitribution, say G,t h a ts a t i s ﬁes G00 ≥− 2G02/(1 − G) (see Curtis and
Wright 2004 for details and other references). This is not a particularly general condition,
however, and we should not expect a single wage to be typical — we already showed by example
that is easy to get two.
11We assume they do not lose their job if they stay home one day because a threat by ﬁrms
to ﬁre a worker for not showing up is not credible — the best they could do is replace him after
some time with someone identical. This is similar to the eﬃciency wage model of Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), e.g., in the sense that workes may shirk and ﬁrms may choose to pay them
enough so they will not shirk, but layoﬀs are not being used as a discipline device.
16one just has a bad day, and it is very hard to come in. Consider the case where
K =2 ,s oc = c1 with probability λ and c = c2 with probability 1 − λ.W e
continue to assume b + c2 <y . All workers have a common reservation wage
for accepting a job, say w1. At that wage they will come in only on days when
c = c1.H o w e v e r ,aﬁrm may choose to pay w2 >w 1 to entice workers to come
in even on days when they draw c = c2.
Obviously no ﬁrm would ever post anything other than w1 or w2,a n da s
always we let θ be the fraction posting the latter. The Bellman equations for
workers are
rU = b + αwθ[W(w2) − U]+αw (1 − θ)[W(w1) − U]
rW (w)=E max{w − c,b} + δ [U − W(w)],
where E max{w − c,b} reﬂects the fact that, at a given wage, the worker will
stay home for realizations of c above w − b. It should be obvious that w1 −
c2 <band w2 − c2 = b; hence E max{w1 − c,b} = λ(w1 − c1)+( 1− λ)b and
E max{w2 − c,b} = w2 − [λc1 +( 1− λ)c2].
The reservation property implies W (w1)=U. Putting these facts together,
we can solve for
w1 = b +
(r + δ)c1 + αwθc2
r + δ + αwθ
.
Again notice that the reservation wage has to be more than enough to entice the
worker to come in on his best day, as long as θ>0, since the worker can always
hold out for a job that pays enough to come in on a bad day, which delivers a
positive surplus every time he has a good day and draws c1.
For ﬁrms we have
Πj =
αfσj (y − wj)
r + δ
, (16)
where σj is the probability a worker shows up on any given day, given wj:
σ1 = λ and σ2 =1 . After inserting the wages, we can show that Π2 − Π1 is
e q u a li ns i g nt o
T (θ)=( r + δ)[(1− λ)(y − b) − c2 + λc1]+( 1− λ)(y − b − c2)αwθ.
Equilibrium still requires the best response condition (3). Notice that, in con-
trast to the other models, here we have T0 > 0, and so there is the potential for
multiple equilibria, even for a given αw.
Proposition 4 For all αw, we have the following: θ =0is the unique solution
to (3) if y<y ; θ =1is the unique solution if y>y;a n di fy ∈ (y,y) then there
17three solutions, θ =0 , θ =1and θ ∈ (0,1). The thresholds are given by
y = b + c2 +
(r + δ)λ(c2 − c1)
(r + δ + αw)(1− λ)
y = y +
αwλ(c2 − c1)
(r + δ + αw)(1− λ)
.
Proof. Similar to earlier results. ¥
It is easy to generalize the analysis to any K>2 and to verify that the law
of two wages holds. Suppose that more than one wage is posted in equilibrium.
First note that the lowest posted wage w1 is the reservation wage. Every other
posted wj will be equal to cj +b for some j.T os e et h i s ,c o n s i d e raﬁrm posting
w ∈ (b + cj,b+ cj+1). It would face the same probability of workers showing up
on any given day by posting b+cj. Hence, all wages posted must equal b+cj for
some j, conditional on exceeding the reservation wage w1. At the reservation
wage w1, however, this argument breaks down since if w1 >b+ c1 we cannot
lower it and stay in business; as we saw above, with K =2 , w1 >b+ c1 when
θ>0.
Having clariﬁed the possible structure of equilibrium wages, consider the




λh. The point is that Πj is a function of wj and exogenous parameters.
Hence, we have the same problem as before: Πi = Πj = Πk constitutes two
equations in one unknown. The law of two wages again holds for any K.
4.2 The Crime Model
We present one more model. To motivate this version, observe the following. In
Sections 2 and 3, ﬁrms paying higher wages recruit at a faster rate. In Burdett-
Mortensen, high wage ﬁrms recruit faster and additionally lose workers more
slowly. Here, in the interest of completeness, we present a model where they
lose workers more slowly only. Following Burdett, Lagos and Wright (2003), we
interpret this as a model of crime. Thus, any employed worker randomly comes
across an opportunity to commit crime at rate µ, with gross reward R.T h e r e
is a probability ν of getting caught, which means having to leave one’s job and
being forced into unemployment. More generally, in Burdett, Lagos and Wright,
when a worker is caught he is put in jail for a while, which means he obviously
cannot keep his job. For simplicity here we assume jail time is zero, but still
assume that when you get caught you lose your job, since this is what matters
18for the purpose of generating wage dispersion.12
Workers are ex ante homogeneous, and have a common reservation wage w0.
Firms can hire any worker they contact by posting w0. However, a plausible
alternative is to pay something above w0 to induce a worker to refrain from
crime. Firms may ﬁnd this proﬁtable since, after all, they suﬀer a capital loss
when workers leave. To see how it works, let w1 >w 0 denote the crime wage at
which a worker would refrain from crime rather than risk losing his job, deﬁned
by R + ν[U − W(w1)] = 0. It is clear that in equilibrium no ﬁrm would post
anything other than w0 or w1.A sa b o v e ,l e tθ be the fraction of ﬁrms posting
the higher wage.
The Bellman equations for workers are
rU = b + αwθ[W(w1) − U]
rW(w0)=w0 + µR
rW(w1)=w1 + δ[U − W(w1)].
Although they accept w0, they get no capital gain from doing so and suﬀer no
capital loss from losing w0.U s i n gR + ν[U − W(w1)] = 0 and W(w0)=U,w e
can solve for
w1 = b +( r + δ + αθ)R/ν
w0 = b − µR + αθR/ν.
All ﬁrms recruit at the same rate αf,b u tt h o s ep a y i n gw0 lose workers at
rate δ + µν while those paying w1 lose workers at rate δ. Hence,
Π0 =
αf (y − w0)
r + δ + µν
Π1 =
αf (y − w1)
r + δ
.
Following the usual procedure, Π1 − Π0 is proportional to
T(θ)=µν(y − b) − (r + δ)2R/ν − µ(2r +2 δ + αwθ)R. (17)
For any αw, (3) is again an equilibrium condition. There is a unique solution
to (3) and
θ =
µν(y − b) − (r + δ)2R/ν +2 µ(r + δ)R
µαwR
12As we mentioned above, in some ﬃciency wage models ﬁrms are supposed to punish
workers who get caught engaging in bad behavior by laying them oﬀ, even though they have
incentive not to lay them oﬀ ex post. Having a third party, the police, take workers away gets
around this problem. Also note that for simplicity here we assume the unemployed do not
engage in crime, but this is easily generalized.
19is in (0,1) iﬀ y is in (y,y) where
y = b +
(r + δ)2R/ν +2 µ(r + δ)R
µν
y = y + αwR/µ.
Generalizing this model, suppose crime opportunities have potentially K
diﬀerent payoﬀs, R = Rj with probability µj,f o rj =1 ,...K. We can also allow
the probability of getting caught and hence losing one’s job νj vary with the
opportunity. There will K critical wages at which workers are just indiﬀerent
for some j, Rj = νj [W(wj) − U], as well as a reservation wage W(w0)=U.
If necessary, we can reorder the labels so that w1 <w 2... < wK,a n dw i t h o u t
loss in generality we consider the case where w0 <w 1 (otherwise we can ignore
opportunities for low j). The generalized worker payoﬀsa r e




rW(w)=w + δ [U − W(w)] +
K X
i=j+1
µi {Ri + νi [U − W(w)]}
Proﬁt from posting any wj is
Πj =
αf (y − wj)




i=j+1 µiνi is the probability a worker is forced to leave. We can
have Πi = Πj for i 6= j since the higher proﬁt per worker that comes with a
lower wage could be oﬀset by a higher rate at which a ﬁrm loses workers, as we
saw when K =2 . But generically, there is no way to have Πi = Πj = Πk for
distinct i, j and k, since the crime wages wi, wj and wk are related through
Rj = νj [W(wj) − U]. Hence the law of two wages also holds here.
5E x A n t e a n d E x P o s t C o m b i n e d
We now assume that there are match-speciﬁc shocks and that individuals diﬀer
permanently in their valuation of unemployment. Let K1 denote the number
of types bi ∈ {b1,...,bK1} and K2 the number of match-speciﬁcs h o c k scj ∈










i is the fraction of individuals with b = bi and λ
c
j is the
probability that any individual draws c = cj. By the usual argument, there will
20be at most K = K1K2 diﬀerent reservation wages, and so at most K diﬀerent
posted wages.
Let Ui be the value function for an unemployed type i worker and Wij(w)
the value function for a type i worker employed at w with c = cj. The Bellman
equations are








θk max{Wij(wk) − Ui,0}
rWij(w)=w − cj + δ [Ui − Wij(w)]
All wages are set so as to satisfy
Wij(wij) − Ui =0
for some pair (i,j).13 Proﬁti sg i v e nb y
Πij =









j and Φij = {i,j|Wij(wij) − Ui ≥ 0}.W ec a nn o wp r o v e
the generalized law of two wages.
Proposition 5 For generic parameter values, we can have θk > 0 for at most
2K1 values of k.
Proof. Fix the worker type z and suppose that three of his reservation wages
are posted, say wzi, wzj and wzk, where these each satisfy
Wzj(w) − Uz =0
for some cj.T h e nΠzi = Πzj = Πzk. The reservation property implies wzj =




ξzj (y − cj − rUz)
r + δ + αfξzj
.
Once again, this is a system of two equations in one unknown, Uz, which cannot
generically be satisﬁed. Therefore at most two diﬀerent wages are posted for
any given z, and hence the maximum number is 2K1. ¥
13The number of reservation wages could be strictly less than K, since it may be that
wij = whk for (i,j) 6=( h,k), but this would be a nongeneric case.
21Combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity is interesting for the following
reason. Having ex ante heterogeneity with K1 types delivers a possibly rich
wage distribution, but with only ex ante heterogeneity the equilibrium is not
robust — it unravels with any ε>0 search costs. Having ex post heterogeneity is
robust, but it delivers very limited dispersion because even with K2 values of the
shock, we can have at most two posted wages in equilibrium, by the law of two
prices. Combining ex ante and ex post heterogeneity remedies the shortcomings
of both models — the resulting equilibria are robust and the model can deliver
more interesting distributions with up to 2K1 wages.14
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have studied some alternative models of the labor market in which the law
of one price does not hold. With ex ante heterogeneity, which is an old trick
used to generate wage dispersion, we pointed out that equilibrium is actually
not robust to the introduction of positive search costs. With ex post hetero-
geneity, we showed equilibria are robust, but then resulting wage dispersion is
repressed by the law of two prices. We demonstrated how a combination of the
alternative models captures the best elements (or, avoids the diﬃculties) of the
two individual approaches. We also presented some other models and showed
how one can adopt some diﬀerent assumptions, say about ﬁrm behavior. We
hope that this will lead to addition work on a wider variety of models of wage
dispersion.
14It is worth elaborating on why equilibria with ex post heterogeneity are robust to positive
search costs. In the model with only ex ante heterogeneity, one worker type (the one with
the highest value of b) will always have zero surplus, so any search cost induces him to drop
out. In the model with ex ante and ex post heterogeneity, there are possible outcomes where
some types have zero surplus, so it is possible for some types to drop out, but there are also
equilibria where all workers have a positive surplus. Indeed, even if all but one type drop out,
the remaining workers will still get positive surplus, and so the market will remain active, as
long as θ>0.
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